February 2020

Nayha Acharya, “Deciding, ‘What Happened?’ When We Don’t Really Know: Finding Theoretical Grounding for Legitimate Judicial Fact-Finding”, Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (February, 2020)

The crucial question for many legal disputes is “what happened,” and there is often no easy answer. Fact-finding is an uncertain endeavor and risk of inaccuracy is inevitable. As such, I ask, on what basis can we accept the legitimacy of judicial fact-findings. I conclude that acceptable factual determinations depend on adherence to a legitimate process of fact-finding. Adopting Jürgen Habermas’s insights, I offer a theoretical grounding for the acceptability of judicial fact-finding. The theory holds that legal processes must embody respect for legal subjects as equal and autonomous agents. This necessitates two procedural features. First, fact-finding processes must be factually reliable. This requires: (a) relevant evidence is admissible and exclusions are justified based on respecting human autonomy; (b) error-risk management is internally coherent and consistent; (c) the standard of proof is, at minimum, a balance of probabilities; (d) evidence is used rationally. Second, fact-finding processes must ensure fulsome participation rights. This project is justificatory—civil justice systems are imperfect, but there are attainable conditions that make them good, which must never be compromised.

Tatiana Cutts, “Materially Identical to Mistaken Payment”, Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (February, 2020)

Mistaken payment is the ‘core case’ of unjust enrichment, and it has had a powerful effect on the development of this area of private law. For Peter Birks, unjust enrichment was simply ‘the law of all events materially identical to mistaken payment’—to be shaped through a process of abstraction from that core case. But this begs the question: how do we work out what counts as ‘materially identical’ to mistaken payment? The most obvious starting point, and that which Birks chose, is the central characteristic of money: money is valuable. Thus, ‘the law of all events materially identical to mistaken payments’ is ‘the law of all events that unjustly enrich one party at another’s expense’.

In this article, I argue that this starting point is incorrect. Rather than looking for some factual similarity between mistaken payment and other events, we should identify the role that money plays in justifying restitution. And what justifies restitution in the core case is not the ‘value’ or ‘benefit’ that money confers; rather, it is a defect in the legal transaction that links payor with payee. The payee is not liable because she has been ‘enriched’, but because she is the counterparty to a legal transaction which exhibits traits that there are institutional reasons to disavow. Just like contract and torts, the role of value is secondary: where correcting the injustice in specie is impossible or undesirable, the defendant must pay whichever sum will most nearly achieve that goal.

Charles Delmotte, “Tax Uniformity as a Requirement of Justice”, Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (February, 2020)

Barbara Fried takes the view that uniform taxation—that is, a single rate applicable to all income levels—cannot be defended on any grounds of justice. She goes further by saying that, of all possible rate structures, it might be “the hardest one” to ground in “a” theory of fairness. Using the contractarian-constitutional perspective advanced by John Rawls and James Buchanan, this article argues that tax uniformity can be seen as a requirement of justice. After modelling how the political world realistically decides to distribute tax shares (self-interested parties act under a majority constraint), I show how the uniformity principle could emerge from the constitutional contract. In other words, rational individuals would choose uniformity as a procedural constraint under a “veil of uncertainty”; that is, with limited knowledge regarding their positions under the future application of the rule. Moreover, I elucidate how the uniformity requirement integrates generalized criteria of fairness and efficiency into fiscal politics as it precludes fiscal exploitation and constrains majorities, and their most influential subgroups, to opt for policies in the direction of the Pareto frontier, and as such promotes outcomes acceptable to all participants.

Raff Donelson, “Describing Law”, Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (February, 2020)

Legal philosophers make a number of bold, contentious claims about the nature of law. For instance, some claim that law necessarily involves coercion, while others disagree. Some claim that all law enjoys presumptive moral validity, while others disagree. We can see these claims in at least three, mutually exclusive ways: (1) We can see them as descriptions of law’s nature (descriptivism), (2) we can see them as expressing non-descriptive attitudes of the legal philosophers in question (expressivism), or (3) we can see them as practical claims about how we should view law or order our society (pragmatism). This paper argues that we should understand these claims in the pragmatist way, as claims about how we should view law or order society.

David Johnston, The Coxford Lecture, “Seek the Good: Professional Trust, Justice, and the Rule of Law”, Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (February, 2020)

When I was asked to serve as Governor General of Canada, I discovered I had much to relearn. Despite my background as a law student, professor, and dean, I had to revisit the legal principles and conventions of our constitution, especially as they relate to the authority and function of the Crown in Canada. My re-education enabled me to develop an even deeper admiration for how precious the rule of law is in our country, how thin and vulnerable its veneer can be, and how vital it is in moving closer to justice. Even more, my re-education revealed for me anew that the study and practice of law is a hollow pursuit if we do not use it to strive toward justice.

Refia Kaya, “Reasonable Accommodation for Age”, Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (February, 2020)

Ensuring equal liberties requires neutral, i.e. impartial, settings where nobody would be deprived of freedom because of their personal characteristics. Religion and disability appear as characteristics which may clash with the existing social and physical environments. Therefore, the necessity of adjusting the existing environment, i.e., reasonable accommodation, is mostly discussed in reference to religion and disability. I aim to discuss reasonable accommodation from a different perspective and ask whether reasonable accommodation should be extended to age issues. I propose that age can lead to differences in conscience or culture like religion. Age can also be a source of dis/ability so it can be compared to accustomed disabilities. Eventually, age may also clash with the existing social and physical environments. I further propose that age is not only similar to but also different from religion and disability when it comes to reasonable accommodation. Therefore, I defend, reasonable accommodation should be extended to age in a special way. The next question then is how age could be accommodated under the European Union (EU) law, especially when we consider that reasonable accommodation law does not have a wide scope in the EU, unlike in Canada.

Itamar Mann, “Eichmann’s Mistake: The Problem of Thoughtlessness in International Criminal Law”, Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (February, 2020)

Atrocities are often unprecedented and identifying them therefore may require moral and political judgement, not only the application of legal rules. Consequently, potential defendants charged for perpetrating them may be genuinely unable to recognize the law that prohibits their criminal activity. Starting from its classical treatment in Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem, this problem has perplexed scholars who have noted the seemingly normal character of defendants in mass atrocity cases. In disagreement with other scholars in the area, I argue for a recognition of a “mistake of law” defense in international criminal law. The Article demonstrates the stakes of the claim through three hypothetical international criminal cases with different political underpinnings, all pertaining to burning contemporary concerns: cases against individuals responsible for the enormous risks of climate change; against abusers of migrants in the context of border enforcement; and against individuals responsible for the termination of pregnancies in abortion clinics. I argue for a dual approach: on the one hand, prosecutors and judges must constantly leave open the possibility of a radical departure from extant doctrine and precedent in charging individuals. On the other, they must recognize that defendants may reasonably not be able to recognize the law qua law, especially when such departures occur. The internal tension between these two imperatives sheds light on the predicament of international criminal adjudication. A recognition of the proposed mistake of law defense is but a modest doctrinal solution for a much more fundamental perplexity of the discipline. Yet it is especially crucial today, with an ever-clearer normative divergence among actors in the “international community.”

B.L.S. Nelson, “Hobbes’s Third Jurisprudence: Legal Pragmatism and the Dualist Menace”, Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (February, 2020)

This paper explores the possibility that Hobbesian jurisprudence is best understood as a “third way” in legal theory, irreducible to classical natural law or legal positivism. I sketch two potential “third theories” of law—legal pragmatism and legal dualism—and argue that, when considered in its broadest sense, Leviathan is best viewed as an example of legal pragmatism. I consider whether this legal pragmatist interpretation can be sustained in the examination of Leviathan’s treatment of civil law, and argue that the pragmatic interpretation can only be successful if we can resolve two textual issues in that chapter. First, while Hobbes argues that law entails the existence of public (sharable) reasons, he does not adequately defend the view that the sovereign is the unique authority over such reasons in all cases, especially as far as they concern known collective emergencies. Second, Hobbes both affirms and denies that a sovereign can fail to do justice, which is paradoxical. Both problems are best resolved by legal pragmatism, though the second problem resists a fully satisfying resolution. The upshot is that, although Leviathan ought to be regarded as an episode of legal pragmatism, there are trade-offs on every reading.

Keywords: legal philosophy; jurisprudence; natural law; prudential obligations; Leviathan; environmental ethics; legal pragmatism; legal dualism

Zhong Xing Tan, “The Proportionality Puzzle in Contract Law: A Challenge for Private Law Theory?”, Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (February, 2020)

This article explores the emerging use of the proportionality concept in the contract law of the Anglo-common law world, first to understand its internal logic, and secondly, to situate its invocation within private law theory. What are judges doing when they appeal to “proportionality”, and what does this say about the ideology of adjudication? I draw insights from the use of proportionality in other domains, in particular public law, to uncover its internal rationality as a means-ends rationality review coupled with a process of balancing competing considerations, which I illustrate with reference to the illegality, penalty, and cost of cure doctrines. I argue that proportionality reflects a method of pragmatic justification, expressing an aspiration towards a structured and transparent mode of argumentation that is anti-formal and anti-ideological, focusing from the bottom-up on contextual considerations, and occupying a distinct space against existing theories in private law driven, for instance, by “top-down” rights-based ideologies or critical and communitarian perspectives.

Andy Yu, “Equity and Homelessness”, Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (February, 2020)

I argue that homelessness calls for equitable intervention. The motivation for such intervention involves the state’s provision of the system of property rights. This will be one that is responsible for but can also solve homelessness. The nature of the equitable interest responds to this motivation. There is a negative equitable right for the state not to exercise its right to exclude people from state-owned property against homeless people. There is also a positive equitable right for the state to provide housing to the homeless, or at least take steps towards doing so.